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How Much Detention Constitutes
False Imprisonment
Nancy F. Halliday*
T HE ESSENCE OF THE TORT of false imprisonment is the depriva-
tion of an individual's liberty without lawful justification.'
This deprivation is accomplished by the detention or total re-
straint of a person against his will, through either words or phys-
ical acts which threaten him with personal harm.2 False impris-
onment is usually distinguished from false arrest in that false
imprisonment can exist between private individuals for their
own ends, while false arrest exists where there is an attempt to
enforce the process of law by exercise of legal authority.3 It is
not necessary, therefore, that the unlawful act leading to deten-
tion or arrest be done through any legal or judicial proceeding. 4
* B.A., Western Reserve University; Legal Secretary for Cleveland law firm
of Thompson, Hine and Flory; Second-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Lindquist v. Friedman's, Inc., 366 Ill. 232, 8 N. E. 2d 625 (1937); (Court
said it is sufficient to show that at any time or place defendant in any man-
ner restrained plaintiff of his liberty without sufficient legal authority);
Pilos v. First National Stores, Inc., 319 Mass. 475, 66 N. E. 2d 576 (1946)
(Store employee dragged plaintiff to back of store and it was a jury ques-
tion on illegality of detention); McCrory Stores Corp. v. Satchell, 148 Md.
279, 129 A. 348 (1925) (Held unlawful detention where store manager
grabbed plaintiff's purse and went through it); S. H. Kress & Co. v. Rust,
132 Tex. 89, 120 S. W. 2d 425 (1938) (Unlawful detention where a lady
customer was forced to return to store and was disrobed completely and
searched); J. J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309, 82 S. W. 2d 359 (1935)
(Woman customer taken to basement of store, detained for five hours and
searched; held unlawful detention); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 136 S. W. 2d 759 (1940); Roberts v. Thomas, 135 Ky. 63,
121 S. W. 961 (1909); Johnson v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 82 W. Va. 692, 97
S. E. 189 (1918); Griffin v. Clark, 55 Ida. 364, 42 P. 2d 297 (1935); 22 Am.
Jur. 353; Kirk, Torts-False Imprisonment-Arrest Without a Warrant, 16
Ala. L. Rev. 217 (1963).
2 State ex rel. Sovine v. Stone, 140 S. E. 2d 801 (West Va. 1965); White v.
Levy Brothers, Inc., 306 S. W. 2d 829 (Ky. 1957); Meinecke v. Skaggs, 123
Mont. 308, 213 P. 2d 237 (1949); Sweeney v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 247 Mass.
277, 142 N. E. 50 (1924); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Billups, 253 Ky.
126, 69 S. W. 2d 5 (1934) (There was neither reasonable apprehension nor
submission where plaintiff paid for articles after accusation and went on
her way); Gust v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 Mo. App. 611, 136 S. W. 2d
94 (1939) (False imprisonment can result from actual force or only from
fear of force, or by words alone); Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 244
Mass. 438, 138 N. E. 843 (1923); S. H. Kress & Co. v. Rust, supra n. 1; Lukas
v. J. C. Penney Company, 233 Or. 345, 378 P. 2d 717 (1963).
3 22 Am. Jur. 354; Lavarato, "Shoplifters" Beware?, 11 Drake L. Rev. 31
(1962).
4 Gamier v. Squires, 62 Kan. 321, 62 P. 1005 (1900).
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Any intentional unlawful confinement of an individual, with-
out his consent, for any length of time, no matter how short in
duration, constitutes false imprisonment.5 This statement, how-
ever, leaves unanswered the question of what constitutes a law-
ful confinement.
Reasonable Lawful Detention
An individual may be reasonably detained by one who has
lawful privilege (police officer, marshal, or other law enforce-
ment officer, private individual believing felony has been com-
mitted, owner or manager of mercantile establishment in many
jurisdictions) and who has been given reasonable grounds to ex-
ercise his legal authority.6 The reasonableness of the length and
manner of detention in such privileged cases is usually regarded
as a question of fact for determination by the jury.7 The length
of detention which has been determined to be unreasonable
varies considerably, depending on the circumstances surrounding
the detention or arrest.8
5 Gamier v. Squires, supra n. 4 (Plaintiff held at gun point for 30 minutes to
forcibly compel payment of money); Miller v. Ashcraft, 98 Ky. 314, 32 S. W.
1085 (1895) (Plaintiff's detention continued for only a few minutes, but
Court said any deprivation of liberty for however short a time without
plaintiff's consent, against his will, constitutes false imprisonment); Whit-
man v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 85 Kan. 150, 116 P. 234 (1911) (Plaintiff
relied on statement of train conductor to remain 15 minutes to give a state-
ment just after breaking his leg; Court held it was unlawful restraint with-
out legal cause); Lukas v. J. C. Penney Company, supra n. 2; Griffin v.
Clark, supra n. 1; 1 Harper & James, Law of Torts, 226 (1956); 22 Am. Jur.
354 (Quoting the American Law Institute definition of false imprisonment:
"An act which ... is a legal cause of a confinement of another . . . for any
time, no matter how short in duration makes the actor liable ... if ... con-
finement is not otherwise privileged.").
6 Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 286, 64 N. E. 875 (1902); Gamier v. Squires,
supra n. 4 (Defendant had no privilege, unjustifiable restraint); Jacques v.
Childs Dining Hall Company, supra n. 2; Johnson v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
Co., 259 Ky. 789, 83 S. W. 2d 521 (1935); Proulx v. Pinkerton's National De-
tective Agency, Inc., 343 Mass. 390, 178 N. E. 2d 575 (1961); Lester v. Albers
Super Markets, Inc., 94 Ohio App. 313, 114 N. E. 2d 529 (1952); 22 Am. Jur.
368; 1 Harper & James, Law of Torts, 230 (1956).
7 Pilos v. First Nat. Stores, Inc., supra n. 1; Johnson v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. Co. et al., supra n. 6; Leisure v. Hicks, 336 Mich. 148, 57 N. W. 2d 473
(1953); Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S. W. 2d 13 (1943);
Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P. 2d 458 (1962); 35 C. J. S. 760; 23 0.
Jur. 2d 434; Lavarato, op. cit. supra n. 3.
s Miller v. Ashcraft, supra n. 5 (detention for few minutes); Gamier v.
Squires, supra n. 4 (detention for 30 minutes); Kroeger v. Passmore, 36
Mont. 504, 93 P. 805 (1908) (detention for 45 minutes); Gadsden General
Hospital v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553 (1925) (detention for 11




Arrest by Officer Without a Warrant
Under state statute in many jurisdictions, an officer may
arrest without a warrant where there are reasonable grounds to
believe a felony has been committed. 9 The arresting officer must
have cause which would indicate to a reasonable man that the
individual to be arrested is guilty.10
If the words and conduct of a police officer give an individual
being detained reasonable grounds for believing that the officer
has present intention to make the arrest, and he submits to the
officer, believing in good faith that he has been or is about to be
arrested, a false arrest may be effected." These elements of in-
tention and reasonable grounds for belief become very important
in an arrest situation, particularly where no manual seizure is
employed, and verbal coercion is the only type of restraint used.
Whether or not these elements exist in a false imprisonment ac-
tion based on such an arrest is also a question of fact for jury
determination. 12
In Johnson v. Norfolk,13 a judgment was awarded plaintiff,
where she had been led to believe she was under arrest by a
police officer, after having been accompanied by him for several
hours on a train to another city, although there was no physical
restraint.
In Callahan v. Searles, plaintiff recovered under what the
Court called a "technical false imprisonment." Plaintiff was not
arrested by the defendant's order, but was detained by a police
officer, though only for a few minutes. 14
(Continued from preceding page)
hours); Clements v. Canon, 170 Okla. 340, 40 P. 2d 640 (1935) (Quoting
from 25 C. J. 493, said "What is a reasonable time depends on the facts of
each case."); Pratt v. Gross, 263 Ky. 521, 92 S. W. 2d 788 (1936) (four days
detention); Leger v. Warren, 62 Ohio St. 500, 57 N. E. 506 (1900) (detention
for more than five days).
9 Johnson v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., supra n. 7; Gorlack v. Ferrari, 184
Cal. App. 2d 702, 7 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1960); Harness v. Steele, supra n. 6;
Johnson v. Reddy, 163 0. S. 347, 126 N. E. 2d 911 (1955); Leisure v. Hicks,
supra n. 7; Potter v. Swindle, 77 Ga. 419, 3 S. E. 94 (1887); Rounds v.
Bucher, 137 Mont. 39, 349 P. 2d 1026 (1960).
10 Leisure v. Hicks, supra n. 7; Garner, Torts-Unprivileged Arrest as a
Basis for False Imprisonment Action, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 484 (1949).
11 Johnson v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., supra n. 1; Callahan v. Searles, 78 Hun.
238, 28 N. Y. Supp. 904 (1894); State ex rel. Sovine v. Stone, supra n. 2.
12 Johnson v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., supra n. 1; State ex rel. Sovine v.
Stone, supra n. 2; 53 Am. Jur. 171.
13 Johnson v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., supra n. 1.
14 Callahan v. Searles, supra n. 11.
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Arrest by Officer of Wrong Person Under Warrant
(Mistaken Identity)
The rule is well supported that an arresting officer is liable
if he fails to exercise due diligence in determining whether or not
an individual about to be arrested is the party named in the war-
rant.15 He may also be liable if he detains the person an undue
length of time after having served the warrant, without taking
proper precautions to establish his identity. 16 If, however, the
officer in good faith arrests a person after taking proper pre-
cautions, and if the officer has reasonable grounds for believing
he is arresting the individual named in the warrant, the officer
will be protected. 7
In the recent case of State v. Stone, the plaintiff was denied
recovery for false imprisonment where the defendant constable,
in seeking to serve a felony warrant, was mistakenly directed to
the plaintiff's place of employment, the plaintiff having the same
name as the individual named in the warrant. The defendant
questioned plaintiff concerning her identity for 15 to 45 minutes
and departed without taking the plaintiff into custody. There
was no arrest, and there had been no manual touching. The
Court said: "the experience plaintiff suffered was one to which
all citizens must submit where circumstances lead officers to be-
lieve an individual is the likely person named in felony warrants
they serve." The Court ruled as a matter of law that the evi-
15 Mildon v. Bybee, supra n. 7 (Court stated on pg. 459, "... . we agree that
a peace officer will not necessarily be held liable for mistaking the identity
of the person named in a warrant of arrest . . . if he has exercised reason-
able diligence and care . . ."; Wallner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Mary-
land, 253 Wis. 66, 33 N. W. 2d 215 (1948); Walton v. Will, 66 Cal. App. 2d
509, 152 P. 2d 639 (1944); O'Neill v. Keeling, 227 Ia. 754, 288 N. W. 887 (1939);
Blocker v. Clark, 126 Ga. 484, 54 S. E. 1022 (1906); 127 A. L. R. 1057, 10
A. L. R. 2d 752; 22 Am. Jur. 405; 1 Restatement of the Law of Torts 283;
Dawson, Torts-False Imprisonment-Mistaken Identity in Arrest with a
Warrant, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 206 (1963).
10 Blocker v. Clark, supra n. 15; Potter v. Swindle, supra n. 9; Simpson v.
Boyd, 212 Ala. 14, 101 So. 664 (1924); Wallner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland, supra n. 15; Walton v. Will, supra n. 15; Kittredge v. Frothing-
ham, 114 Me. 537, 96 AtI. 1063 (1916) (New trial granted to defendant where
plaintiff was detained from 2:30 Saturday until Monday while defendant
ascertained identity); 22 Am. Jur. 405, 4 Am. Jur. 74; 10 A. L. R. 2d 753,
127 A. L. R. 1058.
17 Kittredge v. Frothingham, supra n. 16; Mildon v. Bybee, supra n. 15;
Stork v. Evert, 47 Ohio App. 256, 191 N. E. 794 (1934) (Plaintiff was arrested
due to a mistake in identity, but the officer was relieved because plaintiff
had by his language and conduct caused defendant to believe he was the




dence was insufficient to support the verdict against the defend-
ant.18
Plaintiff, in the case of Wallner v. Fidelity, brought an action
for false arrest on the basis of a confinement in jail for one night
and a day and a half. The lower court rendered a verdict for the
defendant, and this decision was reversed on appeal on the
grounds that the defendant had made no effort to connect or dis-
associate the plaintiff from the person named in the warrant.19
This same question of whether or not an officer used due dili-
gence in ascertaining the identity of the plaintiff, after detaining
him in jail for several hours, was submitted to the jury in Mildon
v. Bybee.
20
Legality of Detention After Arrest
An officer without a warrant arresting a person whom he
suspects, on reasonable grounds, of having committed a felony,
has a duty to take that person before a magistrate to be charged
with the offense, as soon as he can reasonably do so.21 An un-
reasonable delay in releasing a person entitled to be released, or
delay in taking him before a magistrate or in denying his privi-
lege to give bond 22 will constitute a false imprisonment.23
18 State ex rel. Sovine v. Stone, supra n. 2; O'Neill v. Keeling, supra n. 15,
(Court stated an officer making an arrest under a valid warrant in which
person to be arrested is described by name only is not liable for false im-
prisonment if the person arrested is commonly known by that name); Hill
v. Taylor, 50 Mich. 549, 15 N. W. 899 (1883) (Court said mere statement by
officer that he has a warrant or reading of summons to plaintiff is not con-
finement if latter does not submit thereto, and if officer does not actually
take him into custody. Court said here there could be no false imprison-
ment where plaintiff was not arrested and there was no manual seizure nor
its equivalent in personal coercion.)
19 Wallner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, supra n. 15.
20 Mildon v. Bybee, supra n. 15.
21 Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 286, 64 N. E. 875 (1902); Gorlack v. Ferrari,
184 Cal. App. 2d 702, 7 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1960); Johnson v. Reddy, 163 Ohio St.
347; 126 N. E. 2d 911 (1955); Leisure v. Hicks, 336 Mich. 148, 57 N. W. 2d
473 (1953). Rounds v. Bucher, 137 Mont. 39, 349 P. 2d 1026 (1960).
22 Harbison v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 327 Mo. 440, 37 S. W. 2d 609
(1931) (Officer in charge of plaintiff under arrest wrongfully denied him
opportunity to give bond and was held liable for false imprisonment re-
garding the subsequent detention).
23 Rounds v. Bucher, supra n. 9; Harbison v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,
supra n. 22; Gorlack v. Ferrari, supra note 21 (Plaintiff who was held more
than 36 hours without being taken before a magistrate was denied recovery,
but here plaintiff had chosen option to have officer complete the investiga-
tion to save money; the court said he could not take advantage of a delay
(Continued on next page)
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A delay in taking the plaintiff before a magistrate after ar-
rest from 4: 00 P.M. on Saturday until 11:00 A.M. on Monday
morning was held not to be an unreasonable detention in Rounds
v. Bucher & Commercial Insurance Company, where plaintiff
had failed to prove that a magistrate was available that morning
before 11: 00 A.M.
24
Delays held to be unreasonable in bringing plaintiff before
a magistrate have ranged from a few hours to several days.
While in the case of Strain v. Irwin, 5 plaintiff recovered after
having been detained in custody for only a few hours, a deten-
tion for several days without an appearance before a judicial offi-
cer was deemed to be unreasonable in Pratt v. Gross26 and Leger
v. Warren.27 Plaintiffs in these latter two cases were imprisoned
for a lengthy period and then released without being charged.
The court in Potter v. Swindle28 stated that an imprisonment
for several days with no warrant being issued was little short of
kidnapping. Liability based on the length of period of confine-
ment with no warrant issued and no appearance before a judicial
officer was adjudged a jury question in Leisure v. Hicks.29
Officer Arrest in Ohio
Section 2935.05 Ohio Revised Code, relating to the duty of
a peace officer arresting without a warrant, reads as follows:
When a [sheriff, * * * or police officer] has arrested a
person without a warrant, he must without unnecessary de-
lay take the person arrested before a court or magistrate,
having jurisdiction of the offense * * *. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, under certain circumstances in Ohio also, lawful arrest
can be made without a warrant, but the individual can only be
held for a reasonable time in order to obtain a warrant for his
(Continued from preceding page)
in which he had acquiesed); Clements v. Canon, 170 Okla. 340, 40 P. 2d 640,
(1935); Harness v. Steele, supra n. 21, 79 A. L. R. 13, 22 Am. Jur. 366; 1 Re-
statement of Law of Torts 315; Dodd, Torts-False Imprisonment, 8 Mo. L.
Rev. 336 (1943).
24 Rounds v. Bucher, supra n. 9.
25 Strain v. Irwin, 195 Ala. 414, 70 So. 734 (1915).
26 Pratt v. Gross, 263 Ky. 521, 92 S. W. 2d 788 (1936).
27 Leger v. Warren, 62 Ohio St. 500, 57 N. E. 506 (1900).
28 Potter v. Swindle, 77 Ga. 419, 3 S. E. 94 (1887).




detention.3 0 As to what length of time has been deemed reason-
able in Ohio, the following cases are indicative:
Leger v. Warren held that a detention of five days during
which no warrant was issued, was unreasonable. 31 Conrad v.
Lengel held that a detention for one hour without a warrant was
not unreasonable.3 2 In Johnson v. Reddy, plaintiff was arrested
at 3: 00 P.M. and complaint and warrant were issued at 9: 00 A.M.
the next day.33 The question of whether defendant acted with all
practicable speed was properly one for the jury. In Frecka v.
McGuire, a detention from 10: 00 P.M. in the evening until the
next day was not deemed unreasonable. 34
Detention or Arrest by Citizen
It has been recognized in many jurisdictions that the owner
of a mercantile establishment who has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that larceny has been or is being committed, has the right
to detain a suspected party35 for a reasonable time for a reason-
able investigation. This has been held to mean the time necessary
for the merchant to obtain a statement from the individual and
to check his records regarding the ownership of the merchandise
in question.36
In a citizen arrest as in an officer arrest, if during the period
of unlawful detention no physical force is actually used, the sub-
30 Leger v. Warren, supra n. 27.
31 Ibid.
32 Conrad v. Lengel, 110 Ohio St. 532, 144 N. E. 278 (1924).
33 Johnson v. Reddy, 163 Ohio St. 347, 126 N. E. 2d 911 (1955).
34 Frecka v. McGuire, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 262 (Ohio App. 1928).
35 Bettolo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 11 Cal. App. 2d 430, 54 P. 2d 24 (1936)(Search of customer showed he had not stolen anything, yet court held no
false imprisonment, because of sufficient probable cause for detention);
J. C. Penney Co. v. O'Daniell, 263 F. 2d 849 (10th Cir. 1959) (Court held
that detention and arrest has to be done to protect defendant's property
and said that test for probable cause was whether a reasonable man in de-
fendant's position would believe from the circumstances that probable cause
existed); Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass. 438, 138 N. E. 843(1923); Teel v. May Department Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155 S. W. 2d 74(1941); S. H. Kress & Co. v. Bradshaw, 186 Okla. 588, 99 P. 2d 508 (1940);
Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S. W. 2d 13 (1943); Collyer
v. S. H. Kress Co., 54 P. 2d 20 (Cal. 1936).
36 Bettolo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra n. 35 (15 minutes held to be rea-
sonable); Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., supra n. 35 (20 minutes held to be rea-
sonable); Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall, supra n. 35 (Jury question-20 to
30 minutes held to be unreasonable); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman,
199 F. 2d 720 (4th Cir. 1952) (Jury question as to the reasonableness of de-
tention); 22 Am. Jur. 368; Leonard, False Arrest-Shoplifters-Defense of
Lawful Detention-General Business Law, 25 Albany L. Rev. 173 (1961).
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mission must be to a reasonably apprehended force.3 7 Circum-
stances in which an individual merely considers himself re-
strained are not sufficient to constitute false imprisonment. 31
Defendant in Lindquist v. Friedman's Inc.,39 without inquiry
of any sort, detained plaintiff for 10 to 15 minutes. Plaintiff was
allowed recovery since she was innocent of any wrongful intent
in offering a counterfeit bill which would have deceived the aver-
age person.
A detention of 20 to 30 minutes was held to be unreasonable
in Teel v. May, 40 where defendant told plaintiff he could not leave
until he signed a confession after plaintiff had returned the goods.
This was also the holding of the court in Fleisher v. Ensminger,4 1
where defendant's language and conduct led plaintiff to believe
she would be forcibly detained if she attempted to leave during
the questioning. Similarly in Jacques v. Childs Dining Hali42
plaintiff was detained pending an investigation to determine
whether or not payment had been made for food purchased. The
jury held the detention to be unreasonable and for an unreason-
37 Proulx v. Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc., 343 Mass. 390, 178
N. E. 2d 575 (1961). (Judgment for defendant where plaintiff had been
interviewed privately by detectives for one hour; plaintiff had not been sub-
jected to conduct indicating any restraint and was not accused of stealing);
Lukas v. J. C. Penney Company, 233 Or. 345, 378 P. 2d 717 (1963) (Judg-
ment for plaintiff where defendant store wrongfully detained plaintiff on
shoplifting charge; court stated that defendant's display of physical force
without first identifying itself had made plaintiff apprehensive of injury);
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 136 S. W. 2d 759
(1940). (Plaintiff recovered where she was grabbed by defendant's agent,
accused of theft and thereafter forcibly detained against her will); Gust v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 Mo. App. 611, 136 S. W. 2d 94 (1939) (Plain-
tiff recovered where defendant restrained plaintiff in violent and abusive
manner and violently searched her on sidewalk in front of store; Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Billups, 253 Ky. 126, 69 S. W. 2d 5 (1934);
Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co., supra n. 35; Griffin v. Clark, 55 Ida. 364,
42 P. 2d 297 (1935); Fleisher v. Ensminger, 140 Md. 604, 118 A. 153 (1922)
(Here plaintiff saleslady recovered where she was detained by defendant
employer whose language and conduct reasonably led her to believe that
she would be forcibly detained if she attempted to leave.)
38 Proulx v. Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc., supra n. 37; Hoff-
man v. Clinic Hospital, 213 N. C. 669, 197 S. E. 161 (1938); Gill v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. Inc., 284 App. Div. 36, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 288 (1954); Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Billups, supra n. 37 (Court said what the de-
fendant said and did to plaintiff were not sufficient to induce any reason-
able apprehension); Sweeney v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 247 Mass. 277, 142
N. E. 50 (1924); Fenn v. Kroeger Grocery, supra n. 35.
39 Lindquist v. Friedman's, Inc., 366 Ill. 232, 8 N. E. 2d 625 (1937).
40 Teel v. May Dept. Stores, supra n. 35.
41 Fleisher v. Ensminger, supra n. 37.




able time since the inattention and carelessness of the defendant's
cashier was the source of the confusion.
In Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania Railroad, plaintiff recovered
where he had been held incommunicado while questioned for
two and one-half hours with respect to a charged theft.43 The
jury decided that the defendant's actions exceeded those reason-
ably necessary for the type of investigation which might reason-
ably have been held. A detention for three and one-half hours
by threats and suggestions of arrest and prosecution for the pur-
pose of inducing an execution of a confession regarding missing
bank deposits was held to be unreasonable in Parrott v. Bank of
America National Trust,44 as was a detention for 5 hours in J. J.
Newberry v. Judd45 where plaintiff was accused of stealing and
subjected to a search in defendant's basement.
Citizen Arrest in Ohio
In Ohio a private person is given authority by statute to
arrest without a warrant in cases where there is reasonable
ground to believe that a felony has been committed. 46
The owner or manager of a mercantile establishment is also
given authority by statute, when he has reasonable grounds for
believing that a customer has not paid for merchandise being
taken from the store, to detain the patron for a reasonable time
in order to conduct a reasonable investigation. 4T In order to
establish imprisonment by the proprietor, the patron must show
that he has been unreasonably detained against his will either
by force or threat which cause him apprehension. 4
In Isaiah v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea, the court said the
jury would be justified in concluding that a prima facie case of
false imprisonment was established when defendant employee
took plaintiff by arm and required him to go to a room in the
43 Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 25 N. J. 541, 138 A. 2d 24
(1958).
44 Parrott v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n., 97 Cal. App. 2d
14, 217 P. 2d 89 (1950).
45 J. J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309, 82 S. W. 2d 359 (1935).
46 Sec. 2935.04 Ohio Rev. Code.
47 Sec. 2935.041 Ohio Rev. Code.
48 Isaiah v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 111 Ohio App. 537, 174 N. E.
2d, 128 (1959); Lester v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 94 Ohio App. 313, 114
N. E. 2d 529 (1952).
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rear of the store for questioning. Plaintiff here through fear or
by force was compelled to submit to the will of the employee.
49
In Lester v. Albers Super Markets, plaintiff was told by de-
fendant manager that a bag of goods she had purchased at an-
other store would have to be searched, after which she would be
released. The court in denying her recovery said she was de-
tained only a reasonable time. Testimony showed she was in the
store only 5 to 15 minutes.50
Conclusion
The unlawful restraint of a person's freedom of movement,
constituting false imprisonment, can arise from words or acts
which cause reasonable apprehension. The actual time span of
the detention may be no more than momentary.
The right to detain another for a reasonable time is extended
to individuals having legal authority. What constitutes a reason-
able time for lawful detention depends almost entirely on the
facts and circumstances surrounding each particular case. The
question of reasonableness in every instance may depend on a
variety of factors including judicial accessibility and facilities,
the required duties of the arresting officer, probable cause, the
physical or mental condition of the person being detained, and
the apparent intentions of all parties.
It appears from the majority of the cases researched that an
arresting officer has more latitude, in both the manner and length
of detention in making an arrest, than does a citizen acting on
similar probable cause. Both the officer and the citizen must ex-
ercise diligence in the investigation which prompts the detention
or arrest, and the lack of due care or the use of more forceful
coercion in restraining the plaintiff than is reasonably necessary
under the circumstances, will lead to liability.
49 Isaiah v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra n. 48.
50 Lester v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., supra n. 48.
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